

ated for the end of 1966, the enemy forces would require about 150 tons of supplies per day, and we believe our improved air interdiction efforts would prevent them from receiving much more than that amount.

It will have been necessary to have countered this enemy buildup during 1966 with an increase in South Vietnamese, American and other Free World forces. We estimate that some 70,000 South Vietnamese troops will be added by the end of 1966, making a total of about 670,000.

United States forces there now total about 215,000 men. I cannot say at this time precisely how many additional American forces will be deployed.

We are in a position to deploy new forces as quickly as they can be efficiently employed against the enemy forces. The FY 66 Supplemental Appropriation and the Department of Defense FY 67 Budget now being considered by Congress would permit the support and deployment in South Vietnam of additional American military personnel by the end of the year should they be required.

Additional Free World Allied forces are also expected to be deployed.

* * *

Fourth: Shouldn't we limit our troop commitment to the present level and adopt the "enclave" strategy?

These are really two separate questions.

The first deals with holding our forces at a fixed level -- the present level of about 215,000 in South Vietnam. That limit would bear no reasoned relation to the foreseeable increase in enemy capabilities that I have already described. Should the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong deploy added forces, as they are in the process of doing, it simply would not be prudent for us to stand idly by while their strength grows. Our existing forces would increasingly be placed in jeopardy; our logistics and support areas would be exposed to greater hazards; our ability to come to the assistance of hard-pressed South Vietnamese forces would be gradually weakened. In short, the entire allied and South Vietnamese basic strategy of staying ahead of the anticipated enemy force build-up would be undermined.

More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that we have been unable, with our deployments thus far, to persuade North Vietnam and the Viet Cong that the prudent course for them is to enter into negotiations looking toward a peaceful and honorable settlement of the war. I believe that our ability to persuade would decrease markedly as the enemy's forces in South Vietnam grew and our own remained static at an arbitrarily fixed level.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
MARCH 3, 1966

Before responding to your questions, I should like to address myself to the ten major issues within my own area of competence as they have emerged in your deliberations over the past few weeks. Those ten issues are:

1. What is the true nature of the conflict in South Vietnam?
2. How long will the war last, and what reason do we have to believe that we can win?
3. How many more American troops will be required?
4. Shouldn't we limit our troop commitment to the present level and adopt the "enclave" strategy?
5. Why are we not using our full air and sea power to bomb the Hanoi regime into submission?
6. Are our troops in South Vietnam handicapped by shortages of equipment?
7. Are we not facing in Vietnam an unlimited, open-ended military commitment to a major land war in Asia?
8. Are we not facing an increasing risk of war with China?
9. Do not our political commitments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere exceed our economic ability to support them?
10. Has not the United States become stretched so thin militarily by our operations in Southeast Asia that we are not prepared to support our commitments elsewhere in the world?

* * *

The first issue, Mr. Chairman: What is the true nature of the conflict in South Vietnam?

Some, pointing to the fact that a numerical majority of the Communist military personnel are from the South itself, have inferred that the war is a civil war, an "internal affair," in which the United States therefore should not be involved.

Any such conclusion is wholly unwarranted.

2

Indeed, it is belied by all we know and have learned about the nature of the war -- its origins, its development and its conduct -- over the years down to the present. Of course, many Viet Cong troops -- especially low-ranking troops and irregulars -- are from South Vietnam. But that fact reveals only one scrap of a much larger and quite different story. The controlling fact -- from which all else flows -- is that the North Vietnamese regime has, almost from the time the Geneva Accords of 1954 were signed, undertaken to do all that would be necessary to achieve a single aim: To overthrow the government of South Vietnam.

Immediately after 1954, pursuant to the opportunity provided by the Accords for people to choose their side of the 17th Parallel, 90,000 people moved North to Communism while 900,000 trekked South to escape it. At that time, in direct violation of the Accords, North Vietnam's Communist Party, which is for all practical purposes its government as well, directed thousands of militarily-trained leadership cadre to remain in South Vietnam. These troops were told to hide their weapons and supplies and to work against the fledgling government of South Vietnam. North Vietnam hoped that the new government in the South could be weakened and overthrown from within by propaganda, disidence and subversion short of military force.

When it became clear in the late 1950s, however, that South Vietnam could and would develop as a viable political and economic entity -- indeed, that South Vietnam was outpacing North Vietnam in economic improvements and in advances in health and education -- Hanoi directed its agents in the South to begin a program of terror and sabotage designed to destroy the developing allegiance of the people of South Vietnam to their government. Hanoi's "war of national liberation" began.

The basic tactics of the approach are simple:

The approach aims, at first, not at destroying armies or winning territory. Rather it aims at cutting the tendons of the existing government and at exhausting the patience of the population. The tendons of government are its ability to carry out economic and educational programs, to collect taxes, to raise military manpower and to develop a national spirit of unity and progress. Physical security is fundamental to the achievement of these things. Hanoi's first objective, therefore, has been to deny the government of South Vietnam the ability to provide that physical security.

Starting in the countryside, where law enforcement is weakest and slowest, there are assassinations and kidnappings. By focusing on local officials, the terrorists get triple returns: They demonstrate the government's inability to protect those who serve it, they destroy the government's official contact with the population, and they dramatize their own ruthlessness and total commitment -- a lesson that is not lost on those from whom they themselves demand service or taxes or information or silence.

3

As reports of their deeds spread, the guerrillas are able to use local agents relatively openly -- not unlike "protection racket" gangsters in United States cities in the 1920s -- to collect funds, to recruit, to propagandize, to inform on government activities. Thus a "shadow" administrative, political arm of the insurgency evolves, protected and supported by strong-arm guerrillas.

This is the process that Hanoi called down on the South. And, incidentally, it is the process we now see beginning in Thailand.

In South Vietnam, terrorism began in earnest in mid-1957 and grew steadily thereafter. In 1960, Communist terrorists assassinated or kidnapped over 2,000 local officials and civilians. In 1965, an average of 20 civic officials were assassinated and 27 were kidnapped each month. And, aside from civic officials, 1665 South Vietnamese civilians were murdered and 10,275 were kidnapped in 1965. In terms of US population, this is equivalent to 150,000 Americans murdered or kidnapped.

For nine years this intimidation and bleeding of the government structure in South Vietnam has gone on. It still goes on, selective and brutal as ever.

Statistics alone cannot convey the full meaning of this process. Thousands of pictures provide dramatic evidence of the Communist technique aimed at destroying local administration, transportation and cooperation in the countryside.

The Viet Cong strike and run, usually at night. They assassinate a hamlet chief, overloading the police and making good administrators hard to recruit. They bomb a restaurant, causing all public places to be searched and protected. They sabotage one railroad bridge, forcing the government to guard them all. The government must tie down troops and police defending the most important people and facilities, and it must have quick-reaction forces in regional reserves, if it is to limit the guerrillas to hit-and-run attacks. Furthermore, to seek out and destroy an enemy who has no responsibilities to defend people or territory and thus can choose to evade battle, the government must invest great efforts in searching and encircling operations.

In such a conflict, a small, disciplined and determined guerrilla force can terrorize a nation. But depending on such tactics alone, the Viet Cong were losing in South Vietnam.

Realizing this, North Vietnam in 1960 undertook two new important programs that came to dominate the second chapter in its program of aggression against South Vietnam. First, Hanoi began to infiltrate into the South thousands of trained and expert military and other leadership personnel, drawing first on many of the 90,000 Southerners who had fought against the French and had been ordered to North Vietnam by the Communist leadership in 1954. In the intervening years, these men had been instructed and seasoned in the techniques of terror and guerrilla warfare. It is they who led the Viet Cong in the early 1960s as the war in South Vietnam was

progressively enlarged by the Communists. By the end of 1963 -- the end of North Vietnam's second chapter -- more than 36,000 infiltrators had entered South Vietnam from the North.

4

Second, in September 1960 North Vietnam's Communist Party directed the formation in the South of a "front organization" that would remain under the Party's control but be used to draw together any political groupings in South Vietnam that would oppose the government there. Here lies the origin of the so-called National Liberation Front, the shadow organization that has no geographical seat and has never attracted a single South Vietnamese national political leader of stature. The true nature of the Front is evidenced by a North Vietnamese document found on the body of a Communist soldier as long ago as August 1961. Let me quote it:

"In implementation of the decision of the Third Congress of the Lao Dong Party [the North Vietnamese Communist Party], the N.F.L.S.V. [the Front] was set up to unify the revolutionary struggle, to overthrow the US-Diem regime, to establish a popular government of democratic union and bring about the peaceful reunification of the country. The revolution for the liberation of the South would never succeed if the Party [i.e., the Lao Dong Party] were not directing it."

But Hanoi's military program of infiltration and its political program resting on the National Liberation Front were not enough to achieve the overthrow of South Vietnam's government. North Vietnam apparently concluded during the winter of 1963 that the infiltration of former Southerners for the Viet Cong forces would not deliver the prize it sought. We now have persuasive evidence, in part from extensive interrogations of North Vietnamese soldiers captured in South Vietnam, that during the winter of 1963 and spring of 1964 Hanoi embarked on a major program to increase infiltration, including infiltration of regular units of the North Vietnamese Army into South Vietnam through the Laos infiltration trails that had been used as early as 1960. Captured North Vietnamese military personnel repeatedly have declared that they began their infiltration and guerrilla warfare training in North Vietnam -- many were trained at the large Xuan Mai center near Hanoi -- during the spring of 1964 and that they began infiltrating through Laos into South Vietnam in the summer of 1964. Regular combat units of the North Vietnamese 325th Division appeared in the South in the fall of 1964. Lieutenant General Thai, former Assistant Chief of the North Vietnamese Joint General Staff, infiltrated in early 1964, and reportedly is the current commander of the Viet Cong Armed Forces. North Vietnamese Lieutenant General Luong, who may be in charge of political affairs for the Central Office for South Vietnam -- the highest Communist headquarters in the country -- is also a 1964 infiltrator. Infiltration from North Vietnam reached almost 45,000 by the end of 1964. This was before US combat forces were deployed to Vietnam. Our best estimate of infiltration as of the end of 1965 is 63,000.

We know from a study of our aerial photography that, concurrently, North Vietnam was completing the construction of a string of infiltration staging and supply points within its own territory and in Laos.

Bai Duc Thon, an area in southern North Vietnam some 24 miles from Mu Gia Pass at the Laos border, was one of these.

Attached are a series of five pictures showing the development of that area between mid-1963 and mid-1964.

5

Bai Duc Thon area was but one of many new installations. It represented a significant North Vietnamese effort to support their expanded infiltration southward and to enlarge the heavy truck transport capability required to maintain their increasing commitment in the South.

Attached are two photographs taken in the Ban Naflang area in Southern Laos. On December 30, 1963, a convoy of 19 camouflaged trucks heading south was detected near the town of Ban Naflang. The trucks were observed in an open section of the road and represented the first of many such convoys detected during the next 26-month period. A convoy of 33 cargo trucks was detected at Ban Naflang heading north on 15 March 1964. Repetitive photographic coverage of this type confirmed the presence of other such convoys along these motorable routes during 1964.

In the Mu Gia Pass area, as shown on an attached photograph, a North Vietnamese Military Camp and convoy check point was located by low level photography on May 24, 1964. A convoy of 29 cargo trucks and escorting armored vehicles was noted at this convoy check point. One of the trucks carried a large number of 55-gallon drums for POL support.

There was no question that in 1963 and 1964, before US combat troops were deployed to Vietnam, there was a greatly expanded North Vietnamese commitment to the South.

Throughout 1965 we observed the extension of motorable routes southward. Most recently, for example, our reconnaissance has documented the systematic expansion of motorable routes deep into Southern Laos. Segments observed have been constructed to within 15 miles of the tri-border area of Cambodia-Laos-South Vietnam, and clearing operations for this new road extends to within five miles of the border.

In short, what emerges from these and thousands of other photographs is a picture of an enormous effort by North Vietnam, beginning more than a year before American combat troops were in South Vietnam, to develop supply lines and to transport supplies through Laos to South Vietnam.

It is estimated that 80 per cent of Viet Cong weapons requirements must have been supplied from the outside. They are now bringing in additional quantities of heavy (120 mm) mortars and anti-aircraft weapons, and have continued to supply the new family of 7.62 mm individual weapons to additional units. Increased intensity of anti-aircraft fire against our aircraft indicates infiltration of large quantities of 12.7 mm (about .50 caliber) machine guns and ample ammunition.

We have here in Washington a two-ton display of weapons captured by the American 1st Cavalry Division at Ia Drang Valley in November 1965. Along with the weapons, documents, medical supplies and items of personal clothing were captured.

All of this newly captured material is manufactured in Bloc countries; some small arms ammunition is produced in North Vietnam; none is produced in South Vietnam.

I repeat that, during most of the period I have referred to, the American presence in South Vietnam was confined to an advisory and support role and was quite limited in numbers. At the end of 1961, when Hanoi's infiltration program was well under way and when its military force in the South -- the Viet Cong -- had been conducting guerrilla warfare for several years, there were only about 800 American military personnel in South Vietnam. At the end of 1963 there were some 16,000, and at the end of 1964 some 23,000. Our combat force buildup began in the spring of 1965, when the evidence of the critical involvement of North Vietnam's Army had begun to accumulate.

The foregoing analysis makes it quite clear that, far from being a civil war, the conflict in Vietnam is a direct and flagrant aggression by the North against our treaty ally, South Vietnam.

* * *

In the remainder of my statement, I would like briefly to address the remaining nine questions.

The second question is: How long will the war last, and what reason do we have to believe that we can win?

We must bear in mind that victory for us and for South Vietnam is a limited objective. We do not seek to destroy North Vietnam, or even to maintain a base in South Vietnam. We win if North Vietnam leaves South Vietnam alone.

As for how long the war will last, I would very much like to provide a specific response. But no answer framed in terms of years or months can have validity because so much will depend on North Vietnam's estimate of our own determination and of the determination of the people of South Vietnam to sustain the integrated military, political and economic programs that are essential for success. Should the leaders of North Vietnam conclude for reasons of which we are unaware that they wish to end the conflict, they could act promptly -- almost overnight. But Hanoi may well persevere in its plan to take over South Vietnam by force. Then the people

of South Vietnam and their armed forces, together with our own troops and those of other Free World allies, will have no alternative but to continue the effort in South Vietnam to destroy the main force units of the North Vietnamese Army and of the Viet Cong, and to protect the villages and hamlets from terror, sabotage and guerrilla attack.

We believe that we can win in the sense I indicated. First, we have every basis for believing that the people and the leadership of South Vietnam want and intend to persevere in their own defense. They believe -- as we do -- in the justice of their defense against aggression from the North. Second, assisted by the United States and other Free World allies, the South Vietnamese forces have the will and the capability to defeat the efforts of Hanoi and the Viet Cong. Our existing and planned American military and economic strength, both within South Vietnam and elsewhere is clearly sufficient to achieve the objectives I have described.

* * *

The third question: How many more American troops will be required?

Here, too, no specific authoritative response can be given. As I have already indicated, deployments of American and Free World forces to defend South Vietnam have been in direct response to the step up in the military activity by Hanoi and by the Viet Cong -- to the increased threat the enemy forces have posed. Our deployments have also been affected by the changing capability of the South Vietnamese to develop and train additional manpower from time to time. In a sense, therefore, future American deployments will be influenced in important respects by factors not entirely within our control.

It should be observed that we believe there exists a ceiling -- an upper range -- above which the Viet Cong and North Vietnam cannot generate additional forces and cannot adequately supply their forces in South Vietnam.

A major objective of our combat operations in South Vietnam is to attrite their forces, and a major objective of our air interdiction efforts in North Vietnam is to reduce the capacity of the supply routes as much as we can without running disproportionate risks of escalating the war in Southeast Asia. We estimate that North Vietnam has the capability to generate and infiltrate up to 4,500 combat troops monthly and that the Viet Cong have the capability of pressing into service some 3,500 South Vietnamese monthly. If these capabilities are fully exercised and if enemy losses continue to mount as South Vietnamese and US forces intensify their operations, there could be in South Vietnam by the end of 1966 some 155 VC and North Vietnamese battalions, approximately 50 per cent above the December 31, 1965 level. At that point and at the level of combat antici-

With respect to the wisdom of the enclave strategy, General Taylor has described to you the glaring drawbacks of that course of military action. I concur in his assessments.

An enclave strategy would compel us to use American forces almost exclusively as security troops in static, defensive positions in and around their base areas. We would thus sacrifice the greatest advantages -- mobility and firepower -- that our forces presently have over the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main force units.

The broader, and probably more important, effects of such a strategy would be to isolate the people of South Vietnam increasingly from their Government as we and the South Vietnamese withdrew into circumscribed and limited areas. Large parts of the countryside, and the people residing there, would be openly written off and turned over to the enduring control of the military forces of the enemy. Our forces and those of the Government of South Vietnam in the meantime would not be spared from enemy attacks. It is doubtful whether our casualties would be any less than under our existing strategy of energetically seeking out the enemy regular and main force units. Ultimately, we would be threatened with the destruction of the morale of our own forces; almost certainly the morale of South Vietnam's forces and population would be undermined and the Government destroyed.

* * *

Fifth: Why are we not using our full air and sea power to bomb the Hanoi regime into submission?

The answer, in its most forthright and simplest form, is that such use of our air and sea power would be at odds with the underlying objectives of our military commitment to defend South Vietnam against aggression.

Our military actions in South Vietnam are designed to defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in their attempt to subvert and take over by force the people and the Government of South Vietnam. We strive, in short, to afford the people of South Vietnam the fullest opportunity to shape their own political destiny and to choose freely the type of society in which they wish to live. We do not seek the destruction or the overthrow of the Hanoi regime; we seek no territory from North Vietnam, nor indeed any bases in or military alliance with South Vietnam once peace is restored.

Our military efforts are therefore directed primarily to actions within South Vietnam, with the air effort against North Vietnam fashioned as appropriate to assist in achieving our objectives in the South. That air effort in the North is -- as it should be -- mainly an effort to interdict the

ated for the end of 1966, the enemy forces would require about 150 tons of supplies per day, and we believe our improved air interdiction efforts would prevent them from receiving much more than that amount.

It will have been necessary to have countered this enemy buildup during 1966 with an increase in South Vietnamese, American and other Free World forces. We estimate that some 70,000 South Vietnamese troops will be added by the end of 1966, making a total of about 670,000.

United States forces there now total about 215,000 men. I cannot say at this time precisely how many additional American forces will be deployed.

We are in a position to deploy new forces as quickly as they can be efficiently employed against the enemy forces. The FY 66 Supplemental Appropriation and the Department of Defense FY 67 Budget now being considered by Congress would permit the support and deployment in South Vietnam of additional American military personnel by the end of the year should they be required.

Additional Free World Allied forces are also expected to be deployed.

* * *

Fourth: Shouldn't we limit our troop commitment to the present level and adopt the "encave" strategy?

These are really two separate questions.

The first deals with holding our forces at a fixed level -- the present level of about 215,000 in South Vietnam. That limit would bear no reasoned relation to the foreseeable increase in enemy capabilities that I have already described. Should the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong deploy added forces, as they are in the process of doing, it simply would not be prudent for us to stand idly by while their strength grows. Our existing forces would increasingly be placed in jeopardy; our logistics and support areas would be exposed to greater hazards; our ability to come to the assistance of hard-pressed South Vietnamese forces would be gradually weakened. In short, the entire allied and South Vietnamese basic strategy of staying ahead of the anticipated enemy force build-up would be undermined.

More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that we have been unable, with our deployments thus far, to persuade North Vietnam and the Viet Cong that the prudent course for them is to enter into negotiations looking toward a peaceful and honorable settlement of the war. I believe that our ability to persuade would decrease markedly as the enemy's forces in South Vietnam grew and our own remained static at an arbitrarily fixed level.

lines of communication and military traffic. Anything beyond that, short of destruction of the North Vietnamese nation, is not likely to make a significant military difference so long as Hanoi believes that in South Vietnam the war can be won.

Bombing aimed at the destruction of the North Vietnamese nation would carry with it very significant risks of enlarging the war in Southeast Asia. We believe we can achieve our limited objective without incurring such risks.

Sixth: Are our troops in South Vietnam handicapped by shortages of equipment?

The answer is no.

We have during the last five years greatly strengthened our military establishment for precisely this kind of a contingency. Excluding the extraordinary requirements for the large scale military operations in Southeast Asia reflected in the FY 66 Supplemental and the FY 67 Budget, we had already added some \$50 billion of expenditures to the pre-FY 1961 level.

In the Army, the number of combat maneuver battalions will have increased from 141 on June 30, 1961, to 192 on June 30, 1966. The number of Army aviation companies (primarily helicopter units) will have more than doubled during the same period, from 70 to 161.

In the Navy, the number of General Purpose Forces ships will have increased from 781 on June 30, 1961, to 912 on June 30, 1966, and the Navy General Purpose Forces ship construction program has virtually doubled.

In the Air Force, the number of tactical fighter wings will have increased from 16 to 21, and the number of tactical reconnaissance squadrons from 14 to 17.

Procurement of the kinds of equipment and consumables required for non-nuclear war was vastly increased in the FY 1962-65 period as compared with the four preceding fiscal years.

Finally, our airlift capability to Southeast Asia will have just about tripled between June 1961 and June 1966.

It was these increases in our military strength that made possible the tremendous feat of deploying to Southeast Asia within a matter of months a combat ready force of 300,000 men some 10,000 miles away and supporting them in combat -- without calling up the reserve forces, without a general extension of tours on an involuntary basis, and without invoking the usual economic controls.

But the question still remains: Why, if we had acquired what we needed, do we now have to increase our procurement so substantially in order to support our military effort in Southeast Asia? The answer to this question has three parts.

First, we are increasing the size of our active forces because we do not wish at this time to call up the reserve forces. These new forces must be equipped and supplied.

Second, we do not normally provide idle inventories of such major weapon systems as aircraft and ships in advance for combat attrition. Rather, we find that we can get far greater total effectiveness for the resources invested by providing active combat-ready forces in peacetime of sufficient size to allow for attrition at the beginning of a war, and then relying on new production to offset continuing attrition.

Third, we provide in our war reserve stocks only those quantities of combat consumables needed to tide us over until additional stocks can be acquired from new production. As we start to consume significant quantities of war reserve stocks in combat, we start to procure replacement stocks.

This is not to say that every one of the tens of thousands of Defense Department supply points is without a single "inventory shortage." Anyone who has had experience with large supply systems knows that somewhere, sometime, something will be lacking. This is true of private industry as well as government, and it is up to management at all levels to see to it that mistakes are held to a minimum and corrected promptly when discovered.

The acid test of our logistics system is the ability of our forces to take the field and engage in combat, and that ability has been demonstrated in full measure during the last six months. No shortages have impeded our combat operations in Southeast Asia or affected the morale or welfare of our men. This fact has been attested to by General Westmoreland, our Commander in South Vietnam, by Admiral Sharp, our Commander in the Pacific, and by General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* * *

Seventh: Are we not facing in Vietnam an unlimited, open-ended military commitment to a major land war in Asia?

Before commenting on the military aspects of the issue, I would like to note that our military operations in South Vietnam are facing us with no more of a threat to an open-ended major land war in Asia than was implied in our signing and ratification of the SEATO treaty or than was expressly recognized by this Committee in its report on the proposed treaty at that time.

My answer to the question is that I do not believe that we are facing in Vietnam an unlimited, open-ended commitment to a major land war in Asia if we keep our objectives limited and persistently make clear to all concerned -- friend, foe and neutral alike -- that our objectives are limited.

The risk of a major land war in Asia would increase significantly if our military strategy in Vietnam were such as to threaten the destruction of the North Vietnamese regime or the occupation of its territory. As I have already stated, this is not in any sense an objective of the United States policy in South Vietnam. On the contrary, our policy is essentially defensive -- to protect South Vietnam from attack, from aggression that is supported, directed and guided by North Vietnam.

Moreover, the war can be considered a limited one in a strictly military sense as well. As I have sought to point out, we estimate that there is an upper range or limit for the enemy forces in South Vietnam that can be generated and supported by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in the face of our intensive efforts to pursue the enemy, to interdict the enemy's supply lines, to destroy their base areas and to prevent their consolidation of control over large areas of South Vietnam.

In conducting the war in Vietnam as we have, it has been one of our basic objectives to persuade Hanoi to cease its aggression without changing the limited character of the war -- with respect to both geography and the parties involved. We have been successful thus far in keeping the war limited while blunting the Communist drive; we expect to be successful in the months to come.

* * *

Eighth: Are we not facing an increasing risk of war with China?

Here too the answer is basically the same. We have done everything humanly possible -- both militarily and diplomatically -- to make it unmistakably clear that there is no justification for Communist China to involve itself in the war in Vietnam. Just as our policy in Vietnam is bottomed upon a disavowal of any intention to destroy the Hanoi regime or to seize its territory, our policy rests equally -- if not more so -- upon a rejection of any actions against China.

The United States would have no quarrel with a China -- even a Communist China -- that would not seek to control the lives and the destinies of the nations and peoples on its borders. We would have no quarrel with a China that would devote its enormous energies to the betterment of the livelihood of its own people.

But Communist China today and in recent years has not been such a nation. It has sought instead to foment revolutions against established governments, not only in such border lands as Thailand and South Vietnam but in Africa and Latin America as well. And it has engaged in conventional war -- in direct aggression and threat of aggression -- against India, the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea.

Given this history of militant aggressive actions by Communist China, it would be irresponsible for me to say that we run no risk of war with China arising from our efforts to defend South Vietnam from aggression. But the risk is not created by our operations in South Vietnam; it was created by our treaty commitments. All of us must recognize that the United States did not assume this risk yesterday --

or simply as a result of what we are doing today in South Vietnam. That risk was inherent in every Treaty the United States signed with small and freedom-loving countries of Asia who strive to chart their own national ways even though they lie in Communist China's shadow. Thus, our bilateral treaties with Korea, with the Republic of China and with Japan engage us in a risk of war with China. So do our commitments under the ANZUS and SEATO treaties -- in particular our obligations to Thailand which is threatened today by a growing insurgency sponsored jointly from Communist China and from North Vietnam. None of these treaties involves one bit of aggressive intent on our part. If Communist China fears them, she need not.

I assure you that no efforts have been spared -- and none will be spared -- in direct and in indirect diplomacy, in public and in private -- to communicate to the leaders of Communist China that America's limited objectives in Vietnam pose no threat to them. Our words on this matter are loud, clear and sincere. We urge the leaders of China to listen and understand.

* * *

Ninth: Do not our political commitments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere exceed our economic ability to support them?

The answer to this question is no. The relevant facts and figures should allay this concern.

At no time since World War II, indeed never before in history, has the United States been in a better economic position to fulfill its commitments abroad. To take a comparable period by way of illustration, during the Korean War our annual military spending rose from 4 per cent of the Gross National Product to 14 per cent. In FY 66 and FY 67, military expenditures will approximate 7.7 and 7.8 per cent of Gross National Product and less than in any one of the five years 1960, 61, 62, 63 and 64. In order to approach the Korean War figure of 14 per cent it would be necessary for us to spend an additional \$44 and \$46 billion in FY 66 and FY 67, respectively.

I suggest that these figures, as well as others that could be cited make it clear that we need not be concerned about our economic ability to carry out our military commitments.

* * *

Tenth and last: Has not the United States become stretched so thin militarily by our operations in Southeast Asia that we are not prepared to support our commitments elsewhere in the world?

The answer is no.

We have today a total active duty military strength approaching three million men. US forces now in Southeast Asia represent only about ten per-

cent of that strength. Moreover, the three million figure does not include the organized reserve of about one million men receiving regular paid drill training in the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces. Nor does it include the other trained reserves and the vast civilian manpower resources of our Nation.

In contrast to past military buildups, no mobilization has been decreed, partial or otherwise, no reserve forces have been ordered to active duty and, with the exception of relatively small numbers of men in the Navy and Marine Corps, no involuntary extensions of active duty tours have been imposed. In this respect, the Southeast Asia effort is unique in our military history.

The decision not to request a call up of the reserve forces and an unlimited extension of active duty tours does demand some special effort and ingenuity on the part of our military leaders to build up our forces as rapidly as required. But the task can be accomplished, while at the same time preserving our ability to meet contingencies elsewhere in the world. In fact, it will enhance our ability to do so since we will be leaving our reserve forces intact and available to meet new emergencies. Indeed, we have undertaken a number of measures to increase the strength and readiness of those reserve forces.

Including the three new division forces which are being added to the active force, we will have a total of 22-1/3 active division forces -- 18-1/3 Army and four Marine Corps. In addition, we will have ten high priority division forces in the reserve components, one Marine Corps and nine Army -- with six divisions and supporting forces manned at 100 per-cent. Including both the active and reserve division forces, we have today a substantial "central reserve" of ground forces upon which we would be able to draw to meet contingencies anywhere in the world, and we will have more in the future. Simply by calling up the reserves and extending tours we could make ready for deployment over approximately the next three months a total of nine additional combat ready division forces.

With regard to tactical air power, we now have a total of about 4,700 aircraft, including both the active and reserve forces of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Only a fraction of these have been committed to Southeast Asia. In an emergency, we could deploy into combat 2,300 tactical fighter and attack aircraft within 90 days, in addition to those now in Southeast Asia, Korea and Europe.

The major increase in our production and logistics base, achieved during the last six to eight months, will enable us to support in combat forces considerably larger than now deployed. The gearing up of this production base was financed from the \$700 million Supplemental added to the FY 65 Budget last spring and the \$1.7 billion Supplemental added to the FY 66 Budget last August. The higher levels of production thus made possible are financed in the FY 66 Supplemental and the FY 67 Budget transmitted to the Congress this January.

It is clear therefore that, far from overextending ourselves, we have actually strengthened our military position. Our active duty forces are being expanded, our reserve forces are being strengthened and made more combat ready, and our production and logistics base is being vastly increased -- all without calling up the reserve forces, generally extending involuntarily active duty tours of military personnel or imposing price, wage and material controls on our economy. The very fact that we have not taken these steps means that we still have great untapped resources upon which we can quickly call to meet any other major contingencies which may confront us in the future.

It is essential that this point be clearly understood by friend and foe alike so that there may be no miscalculation as to our capabilities to meet our commitments anywhere in the world and to safeguard our national security and other vital interests.

* * *

Mr. Chairman, I have made three basic points.


First: The war in Vietnam was not and is not a civil war. It is a case of aggression "modern style" which calls on us to honor our treaty commitment.

Second: We are applying our power with restraint to fulfill our commitment and to achieve but a limited objective.


Third: We have sufficient power to achieve the limited objective without impairing our ability to support our commitments elsewhere and without increasing the risks in Southeast Asia accepted when the treaty obligation was undertaken.

In closing, I wish to say that, although all of the questions I have sought to answer relate to our military posture, I realize that all of our military actions will be in vain if the South Vietnamese cannot work out the economic, social and political problems confronting them. Everything we do militarily in South Vietnam looks towards the prospect of free elections in South Vietnam. Our government is prepared to have such elections as soon as they can be arranged and to abide by the results of such elections, whatever they may be. I believe it would be a fair re-statement of our military objectives in South Vietnam to say that we seek the removal of the obstacles that North Vietnam is imposing by force to the conduct of free elections in South Vietnam.


I am ready to respond to your questions.




This photograph, taken in May 1963 and pulled later from our photo data base, revealed no unusual activity. Note, particularly, the two outlined sections which were at that time characterized by heavy trees and brush and small agriculture areas.




This photograph, taken in December 1963 of just the red sectioned areas on the previous photograph, revealed that - between May 15 and December 30 - the Convoy Staging Area had been constructed. The presence of extensive vehicle trackage indicated that, on numerous occasions prior to December 1963, truck convoys had been staged throughout the area.




By March 1964 we find this area now includes 13 storage buildings, several smaller structures, and 6 cargo trucks. The presence of a large convoy assembly area and extensive vehicle trackage highlights the importance of this staging facility.




Intensive subsequent reconnaissance detected convoy after convoy being staged into Laos from the Bai Duc Thon facility in the spring of 1964. On May 3, for example, 58 trucks were found in the main parking area. Another 24 were detected a few miles to the north, as can be seen in the insert.




The largest number of vehicles observed in the Bai Duc Thon area occurred on May 19, 1964, when 95 cargo trucks were identified being loaded and aligned in the main assembly area. In addition, on this date 33 other cargo trucks were identified near Bai Duc Thon and along the approach roads in the immediate vicinity, bringing the aggregate total to 128 vehicles. Bai Duc Thon was but one of many new installations. It represented a significant NVN effort to support their expanded infiltration southward and to enlarge the heavy truck transport capability required to maintain their increasing commitment in the south.




On December 30, 1963, a convoy of 19 camouflaged trucks, heading south, was detected near the town of Ban Nafilang, Laos. The trucks were observed in an open section of the road, and represented the first of many such convoys detected during the next 26-month period. While the trucks are camouflaged and hard to see on a single photograph, their movement could be discerned by comparing sequential pictures.




A convoy of 33 cargo trucks was detected at Ban Nafilang, heading north on 15 March 1964. 18 of the trucks are shown on this photo enlargement. Repetitive coverage of this type confirmed the presence of other such convoys along these motorable routes during 1964.



This photograph reveals a North Vietnamese military camp and convoy checkpoint located at Mu Gia Pass, North Vietnam, obtained by low-level photography on May 24, 1964. A convoy of 29 cargo trucks and escorting armored vehicles was noted at the convoy checkpoint. One of the trucks, identified by the red arrow, carried a large number of 55-gallon drums for PCL support.



This photograph is another view of the same convoy acquired by our low level aircraft at Mu Gia Pass. The trucks may be seen in line as they are just exiting Laos. Note that they are empty except, in a few cases, for the 55-gallon drums (example at red arrow) that provide gasoline essential to keep them moving. When observed heading south into Laos, the trucks are usually camouflaged and loaded. It was this and comparable quality photography that permitted us to appreciate in 1964 the gradually expanding nature of the North Vietnamese commitment in the South.



Throughout 1965, we observed the extension of motorable routes southward. Most recently, for example, our reconnaissance has documented the systematic expansion of motorable routes deep into Southern Laos. This composite reveals that segments observed have been constructed to within 15 miles of the tri-border area of Cambodia-Laos-South Vietnam, and clearing operations for this new road extend to within 5 miles of the border. This composite reflects the variety and intensity of activities observed, including heavy vehicle trackage, newly constructed ferry slips, vehicle turn-around loops, and extensive clearing operations.